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THE MISGUIDED REJECTION OF FUSION VOTING BY STATE 
LEGISLATURES AND THE SUPREME COURT 
LYNN ADELMAN* 
The American political system is no longer perceived as the gold standard that 
it once was.1 And with good reason. “The United States ranks outside the top 20 
countries in the Corruption Perception Index.”2 “U.S. voter turnout trails most other 
developed countries.”3 Congressional approval ratings are around 20%, “and polling 
shows that partisan animosity is at an all-time high.”4 Beginning in the 1970’s, “the 
economy stopped working the way it had for all of our modern history—with steady 
generational increases in income and living standards.”5 Since then, America has 
been plagued by unprecedented inequality and large portions of the population 
have done worse not better.6  
Under these circumstances, many knowledgeable observers believe that 
moving toward a multiparty democracy would improve the quality of 
representation, “reduce partisan gridlock, lead to positive incremental change and 
increase . . . voter satisfaction.”7 And there is no question that third parties can 
provide important public benefits. They bring substantially more variety to the 
country’s political landscape. Sometimes in American history third parties have 
brought neglected points of view to the forefront, articulating concerns that the 
major parties failed to address.8 For example, third parties played an important role 
in bringing about the abolition of slavery and the establishment of women’s 
suffrage.9 The Greenback Party and the Prohibition Party both raised issues that 
were otherwise ignored.10 Third parties have also had a significant impact on 
European democracies as, for example, when the Green Party in Germany raised 
environmental issues that the social democrats and conservatives ignored.11 If 
voters had more choices, it is likely that they would show up more often at the 
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polls.12 Also, additional viable parties might well push the major parties into being 
more responsive.13 
However, third parties in the United States face many obstacles. “Virtually all 
. . . elections are decided by plurality voting . . . in single-member election 
districts.”14 Such elections are winner take all, and they are not friendly to third 
parties which command the support of only a minority of voters.15 And even voters 
inclined to support third party candidates often fear that by doing so they will 
“waste” their vote on a candidate with no chance of winning or, worse, “spoil” the 
result by taking needed votes away from their second most favored candidate and 
throwing it to the least favored.16 This problem is known as Duverger’s Law, which 
states that a two-party duopoly possesses a natural equilibrium.17 Thus, of about a 
“thousand minor parties formed in the United States since the 1840s, only ten have 
polled more than six percent of the Presidential vote.”18 Few have elected 
candidates of their own or been important electoral players for more than a few 
election cycles, and then only during economic crises or war.19 And if they raise 
issues that are attractive, such issues are usually co-opted by one of the major 
parties. “As the great historian, Richard Hofstadter [put it] . . . : ‘Third parties are 
like bees, once they have stung, they die.’”20 
Consider in this regard the vote for Ralph Nader in his 2000 and 2004 
presidential campaigns. In 2000, 2.8 million people voted for Nader.21 These voters 
were clearly dissatisfied with the policies of the major parties and wanted to send 
a message. But in 2004, Nader received 2.4 million fewer votes, likely because 
voters feared wasting their votes or allowing Nader to spoil the election for the 
Democrats.22 Thus, as it presently works, the two-party system diminishes the 
message of third parties and makes it difficult for them to sustain themselves. This 
distinctly disadvantages voters who are intent on seeking change. 
Scholars have proposed a number of ways to strengthen third parties. Political 
scientist Lee Drutman and many others advocate that we implement ranked choice 
voting, a system in which voters rank their first, second and third choices and so 
on.23 Votes for the lowest-performing candidates are redistributed to the second 
choice of that candidate’s voters, and this continues until one candidate reaches 
the requisite threshold and wins.24 Ranked choice voting rewards candidates with 
broad appeal and leads to less divisive campaigns since candidates benefit from 
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being voters’ second or third choices.25 Several cities in the United States, including 
San Francisco and Minneapolis, employ ranked choice voting.26 
A less powerful means of strengthening third parties is fusion voting, also 
known as cross-nomination, multiple-party nomination, or open-ballot voting. 
Fusion voting is an electoral strategy in which a major party and a third party agree 
to nominate the same candidate for the same office in the same election.27 Fusion 
voting enables voters to contribute their votes to candidates running on third party 
tickets who, because they are also major party candidates, have a chance of 
winning. This enables third parties to share credit for their victories. It also enables 
third party voters to send strong messages to political parties, candidates and public 
officials, and to demand action on policy issues without fear that they will waste 
their vote or help elect a candidate who they oppose.28 In a primary election under 
fusion voting, ballots are counted separately for each party, and the candidate with 
the most votes on each party’s ballot line is that party’s nominee. In a general 
election, the candidate’s votes on each party’s ballot are combined thus allowing a 
third party the opportunity to provide the votes that constitute the margin of 
victory if the race between the two major party candidates is close29—something 
that has occurred frequently in American history. Thus, fusion enables third parties 
to enter the political mainstream.   
Unfortunately, fusion voting is unlawful in some 43 states and the District of 
Columbia.30 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most of these 
jurisdictions enacted laws prohibiting candidates for elected office from accepting 
the nomination of more than one party.31 Before that, fusion was a prominent 
characteristic of U.S. politics and was particularly significant in the West and 
Midwest.32 By fusing with one of the major parties, third parties were able to 
influence election results and thus public policy.33 At that time, the process of voting 
was different. Prior to the 1890s, citizens voted by dropping a ballot listing the 
candidates they had chosen in an actual ballot box.34 Typically, political parties 
printed the ballots which listed the party’s slate of candidates, although sometimes 
voters would create their own ballots.35 Under this system, the state did not 
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candidates they could nominate.36 Parties that wished to fuse could lawfully list the 
same candidate on their ballots.37 And, in fact, cross-endorsing was an important 
part of the system.38 
Beginning in 1888, after a particularly corrupt presidential election, both the 
federal government and the states implemented the Australian ballot, a 
government-printed ballot listing the candidates.39 Voters filled out these ballots by 
themselves in voting booths. Although the change was initiated primarily to 
eliminate such forms of corruption as voter intimidation and vote-buying, the new 
system also gave government unprecedented control over the electoral process.40 
And the political party that controlled a particular government banned fusion voting 
for the purpose of solidifying its own power.41 Fusion bans were part of an extensive 
recasting of American electoral politics that included the Jim Crow system in the 
South, an elaborate set of rules to prevent African-Americans from voting, as well 
as a variety of mechanisms to push Northern immigrant and working class voters 
out of the electorate.42 
This recasting accelerated after the election of 1896 in which the Republicans 
took control of state legislatures throughout the country.43 In 1893, South Dakota 
enacted the first anti-fusion law, barring candidates from being listed more than 
once on a ballot.44 In 1895, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Oregon passed similar 
laws, and eight more states followed suit in the next four years.45 All of these 
statutes were enacted by legislatures controlled by Republicans who sought to 
prevent cooperation between Democrats and third parties.46 The partisan purpose 
of these laws was lost on no one. One Michigan legislator publicly acknowledged 
that the Republicans were not interested in allowing “the Democrats to make allies 
of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other party, and get up combination tickets 
against us.”47 One journalist called the anti-fusion law “the law providing for the 
extinction and effacement of all parties but the Democratic and Republican.”48 And 
a Populist Party member said that it in effect “disfranchise[d] every citizen who . . . 
[is not] a member of the party in power . . . .”49 
The partisan purpose behind the fusion bans obscured the fact that, as 
discussed, the case for permitting fusion voting was and is very strong. New York 
State, where fusion is alive and well, provides the best example. Because of fusion, 
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securing 50,000 votes in gubernatorial elections.50 Each of these parties has 
considerable influence on the issues on which they concentrate. The Working 
Families Party, for example, focuses on bread and butter issues like the minimum 
wage that are of particular interest to working class voters.51 Unlike the Green 
Party, the Working Families Party does not put up protest candidates who have no 
chance of winning.52 Rather, it cross-endorses Democratic candidates, bringing to 
them votes that they otherwise might not receive and sometimes providing the 
margin of victory.53 As a result, the Working Families Party has developed 
considerable influence over Democratic officials and has been relatively successful 
in pulling Democrats to the left.54 Its efforts led to New York’s enaction in 2004 of a 
minimum wage law.55 It brings new ideas and creativity to state politics, mobilizes 
voters, and stimulates turnout. 
Fusion also brings other benefits such as, for example, contributing to 
integrating voters into the political system. It does this by decreasing the likelihood 
that a candidate with only a plurality but not a majority of votes will win.56 This 
results from the fact that fusion encourages voters who are further from the 
political center to express their views by voting for a major party candidate on a 
third-party line.57 Fusion also encourages major party candidates to distinguish 
themselves from each other and make the choice between them more meaningful. 
In 1970, for example, James Buckley was elected to the Senate from New York on a 
third party line.58 Buckley, a conservative, took advantage of the fact that the 
Democratic and Republican Parties both nominated relatively liberal candidates.59 
The Republicans did this because they viewed the median New York voter as being 
somewhat liberal, and they made a strong effort to appeal to that voter.60 Buckley’s 
victory, however, made it clear to future Republican candidates that they could not 
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cater to the median voter without potentially losing the conservative vote, and that 
such vote might make the difference between victory and defeat.61 
Fusion has been criticized, but the criticisms are not well founded. Some critics 
have argued that fusion results in third parties that exist solely to secure patronage 
appointments for party leaders or their cronies.62 Patronage, however, is a 
longstanding problem, and there is little reason to think that fusion makes it worse. 
Stronger third parties may result in the reallocation of some patronage from a 
major party to a third party, but it is highly unlikely that it adds patronage 
positions.63 Further, third parties that exist primarily to secure patronage tend not 
to last long. The Liberal Party in New York is a good example.64 It gave up on trying 
to influence policy and used its ballot line solely to bargain with the major parties 
for patronage and campaign contributions.65 As a result, it lost support and 
ultimately its ballot line and was replaced by the Working Families Party, a genuine 
policy-oriented party.66  
Others have argued that by aiding third parties, fusion helps extremist 
groups.67 The strength of third parties, however, depends on their ability to attract 
votes, and in a democracy, if they can do this, they deserve to be taken seriously.68 
The answer to an extremist third party is not to ban it, but to defeat it at the polls 
and for major party candidates to refuse to accept its nomination. In any case, the 
main cause of political party extremism in the United States is not fusion, but 
partisan gerrymandering, which the Supreme Court unfortunately has now 
authorized.69 Critics have also asserted that fusion would diminish the identity of 
third parties.70 This, however, is an extremely weak argument because under fusion 
third parties choose whether or not to endorse a major party candidate. They need 
not be protected from themselves.  
Finally, some anti-fusionists contend that the present two-party duopoly 
works well, and that fusion would undermine it.71 But the two-party duopoly is far 
from ideal. It tends to marginalize important viewpoints and, in some regions of the 
country, intersecting with local political attitudes, it produces one-party states.72 In 
such states, fusion could perform the positive function of reducing and dispersing 
the power of the party in power.73 In any case, fusion would not weaken, much less 
undermine, the two-party system. As long as we have single member districts and 
plurality elections, the two-party duopoly will remain. Fusion would actually 
strengthen the two-party system by enabling third parties to contribute more than 
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they do now.74 Essentially, state legislatures should pay attention to the positive 
role fusion plays in New York and legalize fusion voting. 
Notwithstanding the benefits to the electoral system of fusion voting, since 
the turn of the 20th century it has been largely moribund except in New York.75 
Moreover, fusion voting has sustained a powerful additional blow. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, roughly a century after most states outlawed fusion, progressive 
activists led by University of Wisconsin political science professor Joel Rogers, his 
wife attorney Sarah Siskind, and New York organizer Dan Cantor, who later became 
executive director of the Working Families Party, began to explore the possibility of 
a constitutional challenge to anti-fusion laws.76 They created a new political party, 
appropriately named the New Party, that they hoped to develop both as a 
progressive force and a vehicle for their constitutional challenge.77 They believed 
that a multi-party system would provide Americans with more responsive 
government, but that a legal challenge to single member districts or to plurality 
voting or both was unlikely to succeed.78 Thus, they developed a strong legal 
argument against anti-fusion laws. Their argument was based on the right of free 
expression as provided in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.79 
The argument that voting is an expression of belief as well as a choice of a 
candidate is a compelling one but,  in Burdick v. Takushi the Supreme Court held 
that states could prohibit voters from writing in candidates not listed on the ballot 
and rejected lower court decisions supporting the concept of ballot-based 
expression.80 Although Burdick has been much criticized,81 it compelled the New 
Party to rely on the right to freely associate rather than on the right to freedom of 
expression.82 The Court had previously held that the right to associate was 
derivative of the First Amendment rights to speak and worship and petition for the 
redress of grievances.83 Rogers and his colleagues’ goal was to definitively establish 
as fundamental associational freedoms the right of political parties and their 
members to decide what candidates to support and what political strategies to 
employ, and the right of third parties to participate in a system that did not 
invidiously discriminate against them.84 They argued that anti-fusion laws burdened 
the first right by prohibiting qualified parties from nominating consenting qualified 
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candidates and to strengthen themselves through cross-endorsement.85 They 
further argued that anti-fusion laws violated the second right because their sole 
purpose was to drive third parties like the New Party out of the system, an assertion 
that none of their opponents contested.86 
Prior to Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,87 the case in which the New 
Party’s challenge reached the Supreme Court, the Court had struck down a number 
of state laws involving political parties’ association rights. The Court had previously 
decided, for example, that states could not require political parties to accept 
delegates not selected pursuant to party rules and could not bar parties from 
endorsing candidates in primaries or require them to nominate candidates through 
the use of a closed primary.88 And in a case involving a minor party, Williams v. 
Rhodes, the Supreme Court included language very supportive of the New Party’s 
position.89 The Williams Court held unconstitutional an Ohio statute requiring 
parties to obtain signatures of ten percent of the voters as a condition of being 
listed on the ballot and stated that “new parties struggling for their place must have 
the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable requirements for 
ballot position, just as the old parties have had in the past.”90 And it went on to 
reject Ohio’s defense of the law based on the two party system: 
[T]he Ohio system does not merely favor a “two party system;” it favors 
two particular parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—and in 
effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course, no 
reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the 
right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and 
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the 
First Amendment freedoms.91 
Although Williams was a decision of the Warren Court, it gave the New Party 
organizers reason to be hopeful.92 Their first lawsuit, Swamp v. Kennedy, arose out 
of Wisconsin’s refusal to permit the Labor-Farm Party to name Douglas LaFollette, 
who had already been named the Democratic candidate, as its candidate for 
Secretary of State even though LaFollette consented to the second nomination.93 
The suit failed, but three highly respected conservative judges, Judges Ripple, 
Posner, and Easterbrook, dissented from the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to rehear the 
case en banc, writing that: 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the right of a party to nominate 
a candidate of its choice is a vital aspect of the party’s role in our 
political structure. The ability to choose the same person as another 
party is an important aspect of that right. It allows a party to form 
significant political alliances. When a minor party nominates a 
candidate also nominated by a major party, it does not necessarily 
“leech onto” the larger party for support. Rather it may—and often 
does—offer the voters a very real and important choice and sends an 
important message to the candidate. If a person standing as the 
candidate of a major party prevails only because of the votes cast for 
him or her as the candidate of a minor party, an important message has 
been sent by the voters to both the candidate and to the major party…. 
A state’s interest in political stability does not give it the right to 
frustrate freely made political alliances simply to protect artificially the 
political status quo.94 
Subsequently, Rogers and his colleagues challenged Minnesota’s anti-fusion 
law. A candidate for the legislature wanted to run with endorsements both from a 
major party, the Democratic-Farm-Labor Party, and the New Party.95 Pursuant to its 
anti-fusion law, Minnesota denied the New Party’s nomination petition and 
defended the law mainly on the ground that its interest in avoiding voter confusion 
outweighed the burden on the New Party’s associational freedoms.96 This 
justification, and others put forward by Minnesota, were extremely weak, and the 
Eighth Circuit had little difficulty in ruling in favor of the New Party.97 Unfortunately, 
in a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed,98 and did so on a ground that 
Minnesota had not even asserted, a ground that at oral argument Justice Scalia 
prompted Minnesota’s counsel to rely on, namely, that states had a constitutional 
right to protect the major parties, the Republicans and Democrats, from 
competition.99 The Rehnquist Court declared that the Republican-Democrat 
duopoly brought about stability, that the state had an interest in protecting 
stability, and that it could therefore enact laws protecting the two major parties.100  
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not actually explain 
how the two-party system encouraged stability or how fusion threatened it.101 
Rather, the opinion assumed that accommodating the interest of a minor party 
would threaten the system. As Professor Rick Hasen put it, the Court did not 
carefully examine the premise that the two-party duopoly was worthy of protection 
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nor, even if it was, whether Supreme Court protection was necessary.102 Without 
saying so, Rehnquist’s opinion overruled Williams as well as another Supreme Court 
decision, Anderson v. Celebrezze,103 that relied on Williams. In dissent, Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, persuasively argued that the stability rationale 
relied on by the majority was entirely speculative.104 To the contrary, he explained 
that: 
[T]he fusion candidacy is the best marriage of the virtues of the minor 
party challenge to entrenched viewpoints and the political stability that 
the two-party system provides. The fusion candidacy does not threaten 
to divide the legislature and create significant risks of factionalism, 
which is the principal risk proponents of the two-party system point to. 
But it does provide a means by which voters with viewpoints not 
adequately represented by the platforms of the two major parties can 
indicate to a particular candidate that—in addition to his support for 
the major party views—he should be responsive to the views of the 
minor party whose support for him was demonstrated where political 
parties demonstrate support—on the ballot.105 
As Professor Terry Smith explains, Timmons reflected the Rehnquist Court’s 
general antipathy to outsiders including minor political parties, and its inability to 
articulate intelligible standards for assessing infringements on parties’ associational 
rights.106 In this respect, as Smith points out, Timmons is also difficult to square with 
precedent, not only with Williams and Celebrezze, but also Tashjian v. Republican 
Party of Connecticut.107 In Tashjian, the Court upheld the Connecticut Republican 
Party’s attack on a closed-primary law which prohibited independent voters from 
participating in major party primaries.108 The Court rejected Connecticut’s assertion 
that its closed-primary law furthered its interest in fostering a strong two-party 
system, stating:  
The [Republican] Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own 
association, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its 
political goals, is protected by the Constitution. “And as is true of all 
expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere 
 
102. Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the 
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105. Id. at 380–81. 
106. Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party 
Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 7–8 (1998). 
107. Id. at 19. 
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on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or 
irrational.”109 
In Tashjian, an entrenched elite interest, the Connecticut Republican Party, 
successfully sought to define its own associational rights.110 In Timmons, the New 
Party, an outsider entity, sought to do the same,111 but for reasons which are 
difficult to reconcile with Tashjian, its efforts were deemed politically destabilizing 
to Minnesota. 
It is also valuable to compare Timmons to Abrams v. Johnson, a redistricting 
case decided at about the same time, in which the Court struck down a Georgia law 
creating two new majority-minority congressional districts on the ground that the 
redistricting process was impermissibly infected by race.112 “[I]n both cases the 
Court denied a disfavored political minority . . .  access to the two-party system on 
the erroneous assumption that [accommodating its] interests would harm the 
political process.”113 Further, the effect of both cases was not only to harm political 
minorities but also racial minorities.114 Clearly uncomfortable with racial claims of 
insufficient access to the two-party system, the Abrams Court emphasized that 
redistricting should be colorblind.115 And the Timmons Court did not give weight to 
the racial dimension of the New Party, the fact that African-Americans constituted 
40% both of the Party’s membership and its national executive committee.116 The 
New Party had made a special effort to recruit African-Americans and to promote 
policies attractive to them.117 Abrams limited direct black participation in the two 
party system, and Timmons limited black participation via the vehicle of a third 
party. 
In sum, the Court’s handling of anti-fusion laws is problematic. As Joel Rogers 
put it, if the Supreme Court perceives something as mild as fusion as a threat to our 
political system, sufficient to outweigh powerful First Amendment interests, we are 
in serious trouble.118 Further, the likelihood that any governmental institution will 
look favorably on fusion anytime soon is slim. Legislatures are not likely to 
overcome their own partisan interests, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to modify 
the decision it made in Timmons. One commentator argues that state supreme 
courts could pick up the slack by taking a more favorable approach to fusion under 
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state constitutions.119 This could happen, but it is also unlikely. Nevertheless, 
nothing is forever, and it is essential to keep good ideas like fusion voting alive. 
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